

Re

10-8-9

Sheldon - Flying Power
C-II

439

K was wounded by Mikoyan + ^{Thompson} ~~Montgomery~~;

near

Cubel (semi spot)

US downed

K ignored:

by K:

Disaster foretold!

K/T; Catastrophe; DPP (otherwise, what?)

Came to "come out

area, order balance

(Berlin, Cuba; Turkey)

Result of Turkish missiles

losses

(at that time!)

Hilfstrasse...

F. MA

DELEGATION: 441

Score, 449

Was C-I disaster foretold?

Not to Pres


VN, 65 - yes!

443

C-II F. MA. He can't do that to us.

443: JFK rejected unanimous ^{military} recommendation for air strikes.

(see VN, 61; VN-65?)



Brezhnev didn't learn from US failures in VN,

and he went into Afghanistan.


(K/T? SU percent?!)

(Nor do we learn from Sovs - in Afghan

any more than we learned from French!

or, N/Republics from Lib/Dems in VN!

or Obama from GWB, in Iraq
or Afghan!



Count CIA IG Reports of "torture"

Mostly (all?) THREATS

- i45 climbing
- Water-bording
- More operations
- Threats to relations
- Choking

Some chief!

(Not - irreversible - dismemberment)

But also: pain / extreme discomfort, stress / isolation
sleeplessness

"Threats are OK"

even but could it be

Hyp: An enemy that has to be certain
that threat will be carried out
of genocide

is not going to be deterred whenever if

W: If US troops that either!

are removed
(COIN) it will


(If that's "necessary" it will not

not be sufficient be sufficient!

(will be counter-productive) opponent is not "wholly 'some'"

(though known!)

5) If he tries he wants to punish...



8-25-9

Sagan: 1961 VFR SIOB Briefing

VFR is briefed on SIOB-62 Sept. 15

first after NIG (?) reports, no
missile gap

K was
totally
bluffing

(see Reed +
Hendrick)

One whole strat. posture and policy
|| was totally wrong/misinterpreted dangerous. *

~~Sagan~~ i.e. NATO EU)
convinced SO MRBM's

Airborne alert!
Fall-out shelter!

prof 28

(For the matter: Athens } 62 TURKEY '62!
An Arab }
Paris '63
underlines

K

~~Halpathe~~

Boris Gorbachev (wh?)


Halpathe speech Oct.

* Yet, not changed at all after
Sept!

MM program! (preparable)

Hartloff

(French doctrine was right! vs. McN, A/W



Briefs — did it reflect new NIE AT ALL?
just before pressure for troops in VN!

(JFK: JCS is insane).

(like LBS, fall '65)

Note: that although SU regarded
forces against Europe as "strategic,"

the US did not!

(Mendelsohn notes this!)

i.e. danger to Europe... what?

was not to us?

no deterrent?

(is our category as

danger to US?!)

²⁰⁰⁹
NESC — if choices are between

targeting ALL ~~installations~~ on 1) Military

NO RESERVES

2) Cities

3) both... with


or: will a force adequate to deter

if targeted only on cities (Ray)

be able to "prevail"?

Will a force signal to destroy
all cities (over...? 100K? 25K? (1958
NESC)

be adequate to "prevail"?



But if laws require what USAF predicts:
 "Military feasibility" is ^{well be} infeasible
infeasible

|| even with the original work less
 in 1964-65...

and even in 1964, with Eu is
 considered...

(US could survive, but Eu does not
 or East Eu
 OR...!

600M!
 US "prevails"

and with does the species,
 it turned out in 1983

(22 years later
 26 years ago)

Under USAF/RAND (JCS mid-50's) assumption
 about SU — a large deterrent posture
 (us. miss attacks: not FU/ES/NATO!)
 could be argued for; a case existed
 for it
 as I, ARW, etc. believed.


though NOT FOR SIOP-62

OR NATO POLICY (or FU threats)
 HAK

(this we knew, at RAND;

and ~~that~~ we didn't know scale of destruction

[NOR DID I BRIEF THIS TO RAND! WHY NOT?]



Was there even a news story ~~spread~~ on TV
about this?

Press?

Documentary?

Popular book — or article?

Cong. Hearing?


Speeches in Congress?

1987 — post-Freeze

BUT GORBACHEV!

X Challenge to SU to declassify
this plans?!


to Sagan (d/m on p. 37 — Jan 22)
going to estimate with US on SU or
other casualties?!



MGE:

Kater, release NBSC 2009 (4)
notes on war plans

but journalist know in advance -
"DE Challenge"



SIOP-62

designed by a committee

- at war with each other

- suspicious / hostile (Burke; USAF...)

designed by smart people

insane plan

assess making people - civil plan

even if CW, SU hostile + big - income

(as FS plan!)

(a FS ^{esc} plan designed as if retal)

(or, late punishment)

LOW or LWA

(or as if a retal plan had been

started (starting with large forces)

to be a covert FS plan

all, ignoring

Direct Naval

Europe

fallout
fire

efforts on north of Hemisphere
efforts on globe

denominator (Begin: JFK bombing)

Shortage of

Not-battling cities won't make much

difference to casualties

now can be perceptible to SU


(no coercion)

Final Solution

so why not?

(recovery?! "faster")

If an East German uprising While not East Germany and Russia



Notes: Compare "no risk of use attacks of
leaders" "as if unthinkable"
to real "unthinkable" taboo
real "taboos"

Why think as if leaders (US-SU)
gave up large + increasing armaments
after C-IT

(as if we got serious about global
warming) after Katrina
or Tsunami

("when an island goes" ...
? a poor, distant island

"fear is not a good/effective motivator"

not for you?!

(Kashmir: paros "brotherhood")

(LBU: clans not to;
but "toys with mountains")

~~land-warfare~~ mountains:

China

(Korea) (avoided this
war in China)

VX

Iraq

Afgan

(Pak)

(Iran)

New mountains:

Brotherhood

(Dulles')

KU threats

Kashmir')

VX / China

WME


Iraq: Gulf, 2003 (vs. BW/CW)

Alerts; alert posture

Vo: "It's all different now" (Perkowski to me)

as in par: 1967; Premier
reports

me + WWR



Blog

CF/D-L

9-20-09

|| Since 1964, land-based missiles
have only reduced the security of
the US

Warnings for the "threat" of instability
- "so don't give us reason to believe
a false alarm is a crisis!"

or, "madmen"

It has not only been unnecessary, ~~dangerous~~
wasteful (see MIRV!) but dangerous


It never the intentions only of
Rockwell, etc.

USAF

(FC, FS threats: of "mad" or "unstable"
("unbalanced")

Armed FS.

|| while waiting (until Trident) a
dual use winter cap: / danger)



9-19-09

NOTE: "Did US program influence SU
program?"

before 1962 - NO (they didn't answer!)
after 1964 - 100%!

My 1959 Kretz:

original "Marshall Plan"
to make credible threats

(~~permission~~ ~~for~~ and for
K, if we didn't follow
RAND proposals

compared to
real arms control
+ disarmament!

— (WRONG! All
other RAND R's

Advisory Committee

This became relevant, valid (only) after 1944

If as CD (to AGO) as D-L for US

new branch for EU

Change to

SURAB


US RS on SU

g with new-acc

SU ~~miss~~

on SU ~~miss~~

on US ~~miss~~!



9-19-09

see FKaplan 316

1963
JFK

"MAD" was a rhetorical weapon ~~AD~~ to
convince the USAR/VCS (preferably)

(Hyp: undermining the free
open market - to Congress - before
1964 election - by giving the enough
internally (in contradiction to public MAD policy)

LIKE VN policy of JFK (later LBJ)


and McN

X ||| as indefinite goal
for clear pol. reasons -
to avoid public revolt / approach
In both cases, McN backed internally
loss of Rockefeller in 1964
(wanted CO shutoff, in 1961)

so WSEC-50 in 1960 (Bing?) was right:
finite determination
[Hyp: say, cap. to destroy 3 cities:]
visible

~~WSEC~~ on belt rides

(Not good to confront vastly larger
forces: like, say, from us. US)



Sat, 9-19-09

(Kaplan: see Rer Kent study to McN of
1964 - vs. D-L, CP

MAD - is the worst lateral sense - has been
the irreparable reality, in 1964 -

but neither side has been willing to act
or plan as if they believed it -

MC withouts

Service "

defined interests:

albanians

FU threats,


backed by FS threats

disturb

Don Paul

Even worse, leaders on neither side (esp.
on France / Minister Force) have not believed
it - the believe in 2nd strike D-L as ^{CF/deep} north
proposals for not relying on if attacked.

which makes deterioration ("balance") more
unstable than it would be if one or both
were believing about FS and proportion - the
believe in proportion, 1st strike leads to further
outcomes than 2d - without - proportion: so, about



ADW explains an "2nd strike ^{*}cap." as
1st-strike-cap plus S-S D-L/CK (USAF)
(but without HK's ~~AB~~ CD + ABM)

For ^{may} (Type I) det, you should pick up
- Type II det (+FU) NCU, NCS
- ~~all~~ appearance of being in FS cap,
on S-S D-L, and efforts to create
that appearance

MAD as policy

literally,
preying CD

(e.g. ABM - McN did give up that
loop/bluff/infrangible "cap")

- haven't work (except
for FS)

- too costly

- local resistance


(BHO is doing the same, as of yesterday,
Friday)

first period wave

ADW

* Even S-S cap. - as implemented by USAF,
in ^{for} disarmament act -

|| increased the danger of (accidental)
nuc explosions - and possibly false alarm -
as did delegation, dead hand



9-19-9

2. Yes, the SU did not act as if the
accepted MAD — another is declaration
now in practice

NOR DID WE: USAF/USN/OSD reports for
MAD declarations — which did hold down
USAF implementation of ^{actual} FS/O-L policy
("Aphoristic" FS)

[(RAND analysis would (~~be~~ ~~be~~) have
been entirely different in 1955-64 —
if sponsored by the Navy

"too weak"

and better, closer to reality, safer for world]


SO DID US!
→ true as
detering

Yes, as Prof. and Gen. B said, this
did look like preparation for FS, and
at least, "war-fighting, war-winning"
(~~preparing~~) in GW (not only "O-L")

— as SO and US Strategic Force
doctrine called for.

— SU was imitating us — to dangerous effect.
(not because they sought FS cap.

— i.e. limiting danger to such an
extent that FS ~~was~~ non-prompt FS
became a reasonable option; ~~not~~ not prompt
or ESC.



2-

(Hiroshima can be defied down (from 6 million) ...)

but SIO P goes so far beyond Holocaust


1.1 B
(100 full Holocaust, when you add
five (! Holocaust !)

~200 full Holocausts

compared to India's

blacks

America } 1 month
Canada }



both US & SU posture increased chance

~~of~~ — in a crisis —

2) — of an accident (like false alarm)

(US — airborne alert

— F-100 alert (Korea, Korea)

— B-58 alert

SU — in C-II

in Pakistan: mount of overhead,
unwilling to do jobs

3) — of FU

— of ES — extra function, or result of

(a) or (b)

Explanation: What of export: If US goes down to
300-500, other countries will go up
from 0 to "have as many as US"

Chances are not fair (yet)

What country has benefited from arms
because they compete with US!

Change direction / purpose / thoughts of US
policy.



BUT (us. proper formal elections).

what are requirements for Stage II
date?

a) Vo. a one-on-one advisory?

- "Disarm cap" - or
apparent looking one has it

(Park - means "miscal threat" (possible
"unknown" ^{everyday!})

b) Vo. non-one-on-one effort:

(Harold)

"MADMAN"

why did N have
to appear to be used -
to threaten NVN?

and if SO think

of North (as in Taiwan Straits)

is regarded as credible.

(the didn't believe it?)

Why should N?


Real difference is not between the
end N, but between 1958

and 1969? and ^{US} low state in VN

the would have to have

offered work in 1969 - over VN


(yet he advised LB, in 1966, to
use ones...)



9-15-9

My ⁶¹ plan: How to fight an enemy with
a large air force, protected (bomber,
aircraft carrier, mobile
How to prevent (not to prevent, etc, intimidate)
or retaliate if you 'have' to.

So Nife picks ^{my plan} this up for SO in 1976
(vs. Ford?) (vs. CIA?)
or Reagan in 1980's! (Jen B?)



9-14-09

Does SIOP-62 show one besides one
"aberrant human" — Angelotic, wretched?

No: 1 man of power

1 animal with words

1 running a machine (^{capitulating for evidence} ~~co.~~ ^{with others})

1 identifying institutions abroad

1 of (secret, or forgotten) precedents,
historical experience

(start. looking in WWII; American

— acts in secret; for "vast identity + (in times)
now"

— not "ordinarily obedient

loyal

self-serving

causally

secretive

legion

Don't give such man (readers) "the

benefit of the doubt — or leave it up to them —

or abandon or
curious or concerned
to them

or expect them to exhibit "family values"
toward "human family"

9-14-69

[H we had adopted "NFC vs. SU allies

(We wanted large FS cap. vs. SU (Arms)
even when SU had no arms, we had
monopoly.

|| And Wf did we had 500-1000 warheads
when we had a monopoly ^{Aug 1949} [SU army]

Expt II
Expend

But came

first, before

Expt I:

and even left!

always drove

force regiments

Wf did we "need" H vs. SU A-bomb,
or SU H-bomb?

We wanted credible FS cap. vs. SU or
its allies (East Germany, (Berlin

NVN

What Germany;


NK

or, SU vs. East

+ West Germany

China

(Schell wrong: we thought never run so
weak, or "too little credible to have
any value")



11 April -

(denial of the
pump)

C4N a false alarm,
UX, etc.

Start a big war,
or not?

9-3-09

14250

Peter Winter

Holzer

von Hilde

PSR

(PAS)

(BAS)

Bennings + Kanis

Did ICd convert?

UN

MPI !

Call: Jones, Robb,
 —

CTR - new book

9-8-09

(Of course,
dit can "evens"
- can assume
(for a big white)
"frank" (Refinement)

Capone - you get
further with a
punch and a gun

you can hold
banks ... of them

It overlaid by SO -
Hugan, Potent, Capone

Pick: 9-10-9

Get people to think
That war is not
"like" a policy
like health care
- to be traded off
- to be pursued

War is a death
panel

Health reform has
no death panels

Palm is wrong,
she is a lion

(CINC is a mass death panel)

"Hair-Tiger" ?

(devil & Pando/
pump)

C4N a false alarm,
UX, etc.

Start a big war,
or not?

you can't kill
60-100 M with
nukes

without killing
hundreds of ~~but~~
millions -

outbreaks, allis

& rising are winter

Does

STOP—

Premeditated murder?

Preplanned—

committed to carrying
out — threats —

How does that fit
into categories/degrees
of murder?

(or, assault?)

"If you do X...?"

see Chris Hedges, 9-14-9

(WHO?)
What might have
effectively

WARNED GERMANS
in '30's?

in 1938, 39, 40...

("don't go into Russia"?)

What could have
called back police
state?

(Externally?)

Could nothing of our own
have changed course of
history? (see Angell's
Sovereignty)

NOW, in US?